

Inaccurate Forecasting of a Randomized Controlled Trial

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Abstract: We report results of a forecasting experiment about a randomized controlled trial that was conducted in the field. The experiment asks Ph.D. students, faculty, and policy practitioners to forecast (1) compliance rates for the RCT and (2) treatment effects of the intervention. The forecasting experiment randomizes the order of questions about compliance and treatment effects and the provision of information that a pilot experiment was conducted which produced null results. Forecasters were excessively optimistic about treatment effects and unresponsive to item order as well as to information about a pilot. Those who declare themselves expert in the area relevant to the intervention are particularly resistant to new information that the treatment is ineffective. We interpret our results as suggesting that we should exercise caution when undertaking expert forecasting, since experts may have unrealistic expectations and may be inflexible in altering these even when provided new information. [146 words]

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1 Introduction

Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) constitute an invaluable method to estimate the effects of interventions on real-world behavior that is of interest to social scientists. The increasing use of RCTs intersects with larger transformations underway in the social sciences that involve greater commitments to reproducibility, transparency, and rigor. Taken together, RCTs, pre-registration, and pre-analysis have wrought a sea change in academic practices, including a drastic reduction in p-hacking and the development of more scientific research norms (Christensen and Miguel, 2018; Ofose and Posner, 2021). Scholars have recently begun to incorporate expert forecasting of experimental results into research practices to mitigate publication bias and improve experimental design as well as to clarify the interpretation of results (DellaVigna and Pope, 2019; DellaVigna, Otis and Vivaldi, 2020).

We study whether experts are appropriately skeptical of what RCTs can deliver. We investigate experimentally whether forecasters are sensitive to primes that we hypothesize ought to shift their expectations about the treatment effects of an intervention. Among other things, we specifically study whether subjects' forecasts change in light of new information that suggests the RCT may generate significant results. We also consider heterogeneous effects among subjects who claim familiarity and who admit unfamiliarity with the area of research the RCT is concerned to assess.

The study recruited 280 experts from academic and policy research institutions in the United States and Pakistan, the country where the intervention we study was conducted. Our online forecasting experiment concerned the effectiveness of an RCT that deployed Information and Communications Technology (ICT) to improve political responsiveness (Golden, Gulzar and Sonnet, 2022). In a 2×2 factorial design, we randomly vary the order of questions about compliance and intent-to-treat (ITT) effects, the provision of information that a pilot had taken place, and the provision of information regarding null pilot results. We thereby vary the amount of information and primes subjects have available before making forecasts about compliance and treatment effects. We also ask subjects to update their ITT forecasts after revealing to them (null) pilot results.

We report three major results. First, subjects are generally unrealistically optimistic about treatment

effects, and this is true even for subjects who are informed that a pilot study delivered null results. Second, randomizing the order in which subjects are asked to forecast *compliance* and *treatment effects* proves to have no significant effect on forecasts of treatment effects; that is, forecasters do not infer treatment effects based on their predictions about compliance rates, as we would expect. Similarly, varying when subjects are exposed to the information that a *pilot* intervention generated null results has no significant effects on forecasts of treatment effects. In general, therefore, subjects fail to incorporate information in meaningful ways into their forecasts and to become more realistic about likely treatment effects. Our third main result is that only a subset of subjects — those who do not report expertise in the subject area of the RCT — update as expected on the basis of the pilot’s null results. Thus, we provide evidence that researchers who self-identify as experts are especially unresponsive to information about the RCT.

The main take-away of the results we present is thus that academics too easily believe that an RCT is likely to be successful and are not discouraged in these beliefs even when presented information that should lead them to suspect an intervention will not generate effects. Moreover, subjects who consider themselves more expert in the subject matter domain of the intervention are particularly resistant to incorporating new information into their forecasts. These results generate some worry that there might be too much systematic optimism about RCT interventions among forecasters. In our conclusions, we discuss how this needs to be taken into consideration when using forecasting as a tool to benchmark knowledge accumulation.

Our findings contribute to the growing literature on forecasting. Scholars have begun to incorporate expert forecasting of experimental results into the picture, again in order to mitigate publication bias and improve experimental design as well as to clarify the interpretation of results (DellaVigna and Pope, 2019; DellaVigna, Otis and Vivaldi, 2020). The appeal of forecasting to the social science community is evidenced by the creation of the Social Science Prediction Platform, a web-based forecasting platform that in its first ten months of existence attracted 1,700 users, 19 research projects seeking forecasts, and over 1,600 predictions (CEGA, 2021). Pioneering studies have used forecasts by experts to quantify the extent of novel information generated by particular RCTs (Humphreys,

Sánchez de la Sierra and Van der Windt, 2019; Casey et al., 2018; Cooper, 2018). Forecasts may prevent consumers of research results from discrediting evidence generated by an RCT with the claim that it corroborates preexisting expectations; the forecast clearly indicates what these expectations were in the first place. Thus, by forecasting an experiment prior to releasing its results, researchers put themselves on solid ground when they state that their intervention generated unexpected results. However, the work reported here suggests that forecasting does not represent a panacea. Instead, unrealistically optimistic forecasts may simply provide cover for experimental work that happens to succeed.

2 Experimental Design and Implementation

2.1 Sample

For our experiment, we recruited subjects from research institutions based in the United States and in Pakistan. Our subject pool was recruited via email as follows: 208 subjects from all individual members of the Comparative Politics Organized Section of the American Political Science Association; 35 subjects from all political science graduate students at Stanford University and at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA); 27 subjects from policy professionals at the Centre for Economic Research in Pakistan (CERP), an organization whose staff has expertise in implementing randomized controlled trials. Finally, we also recruited 15 subjects in person in a graduate student seminar at the University of California at San Diego (UCSD). Of the final sample of 280 subjects, 148 comprise university faculty, 77 graduate students, 16 postdocs, and 39 other research staff. Forecasts were financially incentivized, with the top forecasting percentile receiving a modest payment depending on the mean absolute deviation from actual RCT results. Information on the full composition of the experimental and non-experimental subject sample is reported in Table C.2.

2.2 Summary of Study of which Forecasts were Elicited

Subjects were asked to forecast the results of the experiment reported in [Golden, Gulzar and Sonnet \(2022\)](#) that we briefly summarize now: the authors of the paper piloted and then scaled a field experiment where they partnered with Members of the Provincial Assembly (MPAs) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan. They asked MPAs to use Interactive Voice Response (IVR) technology to spur two-way communication between MPAs and heads of households who are their constituents. The treatment involved MPAs recording a message that was sent via robocall to constituents. Sometimes the message was accompanied by a question that the constituents could answer by pressing keys on their phone.

In the analysis that follows, *Compliance* consists of the proportion of households who answered the phone, and when asked, the proportion who answered the question their MPA sent them. *Treatment effects* consist of whether treated households changed their *evaluations of MPA*, their *evaluations of government performance*, and the *likelihood they would hold their MPA accountable for performance*. These outcomes are each constructed as an index drawing on multiple items (for details, see the notes in Table 3. In the text below, we refer to these as the MPA, GOVT, and ACCOUNTABILITY indices.

In addition to randomizing whether households received the initial *call* recorded by their MPA, the intervention randomized whether a follow-up phone call was *responsive* to the aggregate feedback received from voters or whether it was a *generic* follow-up. Results were null in both the pilot and the follow-up for all outcomes.

2.3 Hypotheses, Allocation, and Treatment

We assigned the 280 subjects to four different treatment arms formed by a 2×2 factorial design (see the experimental flowchart depicted in Figure 1 by simple random assignment. The forecasting survey was administered online via Qualtrics. Results of randomization tests, reported in Tables [D.1](#), [D.2](#), [D.3](#), [D.4](#), show data confirming balance of treatment groups across measured covariates.

The forecasting survey employed a fixed set of primes and tasks for respondents. Experimental varia-

Legend

— Experimental factors - - - - - Survey elements unrelated to factorial design Factor 1: Forecast compliance before/after ITT Factor 2: Prime about pilot before/after ITT forecast




Figure 1: Experimental design. *Forecast compliance before/after ITT* refers to question ordering about when respondents forecast compliance rates and when they forecast treatment effects. Compliance percentages were requested for answering the MPA’s call and for answering the MPA’s question. Treatment effects were elicited in standard deviation units. *Pilot results* refers to presentation of null treatment effects for three outcomes of interest in the pilot. *Prime about pilot* refers to a short informational vignette embedded in the survey where respondents read the following text: “Pilot and Scale-up: This program was designed through a pilot that we conducted with one MPA in [district name redacted] in 2016 (shown in red on the map). This pilot was conducted with 1,200 households. The scale-up project was implemented in the blue areas in this map.”

tion changed the order of the primes and tasks, thereby altering the amount and nature of information subjects had available at the time they made forecasts of treatment effects. The four arms generated by the 2×2 design differ only in the order with which certain primes and tasks about the RCT appear for survey participants. *Factor 1* consists of two conditions: whether subjects were asked to forecast the RCT compliance rate before or after they were asked to forecast the ITT effect. *Factor 2* consists of two conditions: whether subjects receive a prime about the fact that a pilot study of the RCT had taken place before or after the ITT forecast. We show this factorial design in a 2×2 matrix in Table 1.

		Forecast compliance	
		Before ITT	After ITT
Prime about pilot	Before ITT	T1 (N = 68)	T3 (N = 72)
	After ITT	T2 (N = 76)	T4 (N = 64)

Table 1: Factorial experiment to elicit forecasts.

Based on this experimental randomization, we are able to evaluate the following two hypotheses. First, we evaluate whether forecasting compliance before ITT effects *reduces* ITT estimates. The reasoning underlying this hypothesis is that field experiments in the domain of political participation are well known for low compliance. Field experiments about electoral turnout, for instance, generally elicit compliance rates of only about 25 percent (Schein et al., 2020), and those that use ICT to elicit political engagement generate compliance rates in the single digits (see Table A.1 in Golden, Gulzar and Sonnet (2022)). Although high compliance rates by no means guarantee significant ITT effects, low compliance substantially undermines the likelihood that an intervention will generate significant treatment effects (see Gerber and Green (2012), ch. 5). Thus, asking subjects to consider compliance before asking them to forecast treatment effects in effect reminds them that compliance may well be problematic. We thus expect this item ordering to lower expectations for both compliance and treatment effects.

Second, we expect that informing subjects that a pilot occurred *increases* ITT estimates (and possibly compliance forecasts as well). The reason is that funding agencies are more likely to allow scale up if a pilot delivered significant results, whereas if a pilot “didn’t work,” scholars might abandon the project altogether. Thus, knowing that a pilot occurred should make subjects more optimistic about the outcome of the intervention.

The ordering of our primes and tasks, depicted in Figure 1, also permits experimental evaluation of a third hypothesis. Subjects who forecast compliance after ITT effects (T3 and T4) were also given the information that the pilot study did not result in statistically significant findings.¹ We expect

¹They were also given a number of other primes and tasks before forecasting compliance. We have no way to unbundle these from the information that pilot results were null, but theoretically we focus on the importance of the pilot results because we expect these to be especially consequential.

information that pilot results were null *decreases* forecasts of compliance. This is because the null pilot results might be interpreted post hoc as a result of poor compliance. Thus, the three main hypotheses that we evaluate experimentally are:

H1: Forecasting compliance before ITT effects results in lower ITT forecasts.

H2: Knowing a pilot occurred before forecasting ITT effects results in higher ITT forecasts.

H3: Knowing a pilot produced null findings results in a lower compliance forecast.

We summarize the causal quantities of interest in Table 2.

Table 2: Estimands of interest

Hyp:	Comparison	Outcome	Effect of interest
H1	$\{T1, T3\}$ vs $\{T2, T4\}$	ITT forecast	Effect of pilot prime
H2	$\{T1, T2\}$ vs $\{T3, T4\}$	ITT forecast	Effect of compliance prime
H3	$\{T3, T4\}$ vs $\{T1, T2\}$	Compliance forecast	Effect of pilot results

Effect of pilot prime denotes the effect of receiving information that a pilot study took place prior to full RCT. *Effect of compliance prime* denotes the effect of being asked to forecast the compliance rate of the RCT prior to forecasting the ITT effect. *Effect of pilot results* denotes the effect of being asked to forecast the compliance rate after receiving the information that pilot results were null.

2.4 Empirical Strategy and Estimation

We employ two strategies to construct estimates of the quantities of interest. Our main approach is to pool treatment arms according to Table 2, i.e. depending on the outcome. For the ITT forecasts, we calculate difference-in-group-means via OLS of the form $Y_i = \alpha + \beta C_i + \varepsilon_i$ as well as $Y_i = \alpha + \beta P_i + \varepsilon_i$, with Y_i an individual’s average forecast of the ITT (pooled across MPA, GOVT and ACCOUNTABILITY indices). C_i (compliance prime) is 1 if an individual is in $\{T1, T2\}$ and 0 otherwise, and P_i (pilot prime) is 1 if an individual is in $\{T1, T3\}$ and 0 otherwise. This corresponds to estimating the quantities in rows 1 and 2 of Table 2; i.e. the effects of pilot and compliance primes on ITT forecasts.

For compliance forecasts, we we calculate difference-in-group-means via OLS of the form $Y_i = \alpha + \beta R_i + \varepsilon_i$, where Y_i is an individual’s compliance forecast estimated separately for two types of

compliance (answering the MPA’s call and then answering his question) and R_i is an indicator that takes a value of 1 if the individual was in $\{T3, T4\}$, i.e. has seen the pilot results before making the compliance forecasts. This corresponds to estimating the quantity in the third row of Table 2, i.e. the effects of pilot results on compliance forecasts.

An additional approach to the analysis of our ITT forecasts is to compare the different combinations of the 2×2 design by interacting the two treatment indicators representing the pilot prime first and the compliance forecast first, such that $Y_i = \alpha + \beta C_i + \gamma P_i + \delta C_i P_i + \varepsilon_i$. This allows us to compare those who (i) received the prime that a pilot had taken place as well as (ii) were asked to forecast compliance before making the ITT forecasts to those who were asked to forecast compliance after the ITT. This lets us estimate whether any effect of the pilot prime on ITT forecasts depends on whether subjects were primed to think about compliance first before making their ITT forecasts, a plausible conjecture as the hypothesized positive effect of a pilot prime on ITT forecasts could be offset by anticipation of low compliance. It also helps us understand the mechanism at work by teasing out whether the pilot prime already also primes subjects to think about likely compliance and thus illuminates the nature of the pilot prime treatment.

Summary statistics for all outcome measures and important pre-treatment covariates on which we condition in the analyses of CATEs are presented in Table C.1.

3 Results

We begin with some descriptive statistics that come out of the forecasts. In Table 3, we present realized treatment effects of the pilot study and of the scaled-up RCT along with average forecasts of these effects made by our subjects for different components of the experiment. The first thing to note is that in every case, forecast averages are higher than realized treatment effects. The only exception is the effect of the robocall (versus the control group that did not receive a call) on the ACCOUNTABILITY index, where the pilot produced treatment effects that were stronger than the intervention or than forecast by experts. Moreover, mean forecasts are much larger than the ITT effects realized in the

intervention, often more than five times as large. Thus, experts are unrealistically optimistic about the intervention, forecasting much stronger treatment effects than were in fact obtained.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics of outcomes of interest in the pilot, RCT, and forecasts

<i>Effect of ...</i>	Pilot ITT	Intervention ITT	Mean forecast
Call on MPA	0.09	0.02	0.09
Call on GOVT	-0.05	0.02	0.06
Call on ACCOUNTABILITY	0.12	0.00	0.05
Responsive on MPA	0.01	0.02	0.10
Responsive on GOVT	0.03	-0.02	0.08
Responsive on ACCOUNTABILITY	0.05	-0.01	0.06
Compliance rate phone	NA	73.1	48.9
Compliance rate question	NA	23.8	50.9

Call refers to a comparison of the treatment arm in which households received a robo-call containing a message and a question from their MPA versus a control group that received no call. *Responsive* refers to a comparison of the treatment arm in which households received a robocall containing a message and a question from their MPA and then received a responsive follow-up call (mentioning the action taken by the MPA in response to feedback) versus the arm which received a generic follow-up call (thanking citizens for input). *MPA* refers to an incumbent evaluation index that aggregates questions about (i) MPA feeling thermometer (1–10), (ii) MPA party feeling thermometer (1–10), (iii) voted for MPA (0/1). *GOVT* refers to a government evaluation index that aggregates questions about (i) state looks after me (1–5), (ii) importance of elections (1–5), provincial government competence (1–5). *ACCOUNTABILITY* refers to the prospects for accountability index that aggregates questions about (i) political efficacy (1–5), vote choice based on performance (1-6).

The table also reports actual compliance rates of the intervention on the two major activities required: answering the MPA’s phone call and, conditional on answering the phone, using Interactive Voice Response (IVR) technology to answer a question that was posed by the MPA. The mean forecast for each was just over 50 percent, which substantially underestimates compliance in answering the phone but overestimates it for answering a question. This shows that the guesses made by forecasters about compliance rates are highly inaccurate and that experts are not able to predict compliance rates; their guesses are about 25 percentage points off the mark.

We now estimate two main outcomes of the forecasting experiment. The first is the forecast of the intervention’s ITT. We elicit respondents’ forecast of treatment effects in units of standard deviations.

Forecasts were made for both the generic and responsive treatment arms of the RCT, and separately for effects of the treatment on indices of evaluations of the MPA, the government, and prospects for accountability in each arm (which we continue to label MPA, GOVT, and ACCOUNTABILITY). We also calculate an average across the three indices to retrieve an overall ITT forecast; this is the outcome reported in tables unless stated otherwise. We retrieved a 100% response rate with no attrition from the 280 subjects.

The second outcome of interest is respondents' forecasts of compliance rates in the RCT, both on (i) answering the MPA's call then on (ii) answering a question conditional on (i). We solicit forecasts of compliance rates in percentages. There was minor attrition on these questions, with three out of the 280 subjects failing to answer.²

3.1 Forecasts of Treatment Effects

Results of the experiment on average ITT forecasts (pooling across MPA, GOVT, and ACCOUNTABILITY indices) are presented in Table 4. As is clear from the estimation results there, the two sets of forecasts we manipulated experimentally generate no significant treatment effects, either separately or interactively. Consider the comparison presented in row 1 of Table 4, which compares those who received the pilot prime before the ITT forecasts (T1 and T3) to those who received the pilot prime after making ITT forecasts (T2 and T4). The OLS estimates of this comparison appear in columns 1 and 4, the first for receiving the MPA's call and the second for later receiving responsive feedback.

²As an additional robustness exercise, we present in Tables A.3, A.4 and A.5 treatment effects on forecasting errors (measured as absolute distance between the initial forecast and the actual compliance/pilot result) as well as the magnitude of updating (measured as the difference between revised and initial estimate) and direction of updating of forecasts (measured as the unit change in update toward correct estimate). We interpret this additional set of results as evidence that the informational treatments about the RCT design did not improve the accuracy of forecasts, nor did it lead respondents to update their forecast, let alone in the correct direction.

Knowing that a pilot occurred before being asked to make an ITT forecast does not alter forecasts in either direction; point estimates are essentially zero for all outcomes and treatment conditions.³ The same is the case for the comparison presented in row 2, which pools ITT forecasts from T1 and T2 and compares them to the pooled forecasts from T3 and T4; this compares groups who made their compliance rate forecasts before forecasting ITT to those who forecast compliance rates after forecasting ITT effects. ITT forecasts are immune to change even when subjects are asked to think about compliance beforehand, as can be seen from the results reported in columns 2 and 5.

Table 4: Experimental effects for ITT forecasts (average across indices)

	Forecast call on ITT			Forecast responsive on ITT		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Pilot prime	0.000 (0.006)		-0.005 (0.009)	0.004 (0.007)		0.002 (0.009)
Compliance prime		0.009 (0.006)	0.003 (0.009)		0.010 (0.007)	0.008 (0.009)
Interaction P x C			0.012 (0.012)			0.005 (0.014)
Constant	0.065*** (0.004)	0.061*** (0.004)	0.064*** (0.007)	0.077*** (0.005)	0.074*** (0.005)	0.073*** (0.007)
Num. obs.	280	280	280	280	280	280

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. OLS estimates with HC2 standard errors. *Forecast call on ITT* refers to the comparison of the treatment arm in which households received a call with a message and a question from their MPA versus the control group that received no call. *Forecast responsive on ITT* refers to a comparison of the treatment arm in which households received a call with a message, a question, and a responsive follow-up call from their MPA (mentioning the action taken by the MPA in response to feedback) versus the arm that received a generic follow-up call (thanking citizens for the input).

3.2 Forecasts of Compliance Rate

We now turn to forecasts of compliance. These are presented in Table 5, which reports pooled compliance forecasts from T3 and T4 and compares them to pooled forecasts from T1 and T2. Subjects in T3 and T4 were presented a range of information about the pilot (including results), whereas subjects in T1 and T2 did not know pilot results before making compliance forecasts. The results are estimated via OLS for two forecast compliance rates (answering the call and then answering a question) on an

³Separate results for MPA, GOVT, and ACCOUNTABILITY are included in Tables A.6 and A.7.

indicator coded 1 if the subject is in $\{T3, T4\}$ and 0 if in $\{T1, T2\}$.⁴

Table 5: Experimental effects for compliance forecasts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Compliance rate for call	Compliance rate for question
Pilot results effect	-0.048** (0.024)	-0.079*** (0.029)
Constant	0.512*** (0.016)	0.547*** (0.019)
Num. obs.	277	277

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. OLS estimates with HC2 standard errors. *Compliance rate for call* refers to the percentage of treated RCT subjects who answer the MPA's call. *Compliance rate for question* refers to the percentage of treated RCT subjects answering the call who also answer the MPA's question.

Being provided a wide array of information about the pilot — in particular, knowing the pilot results were null — decreases forecasts of compliance rates by 5 percentage points for answering the MPA's call and 8 percentage points for then answering his question.⁵ The same comparison shows that when subjects are asked to forecast compliance before forecasting treatment effects, the forecast compliance rate is significantly greater for both measures of compliance. When primed to think about compliance before giving an ITT forecast, the forecast compliance rates are 5 percentage points (for answering the call) and 8 percentage points (for answering a question) higher than the compliance rates predicted by subjects who were asked to forecast compliance at the end of the experimental module. Thus, forecasts of compliance appear sensitive to primes and to new information, unlike forecasts of treatment effects. We interpret this as evidence that negative shifts in perceptions of compliance induced by our information treatments do not automatically translate into lower — more pessimistic — estimates of

⁴As Figure 1 documents, another feature that differs between $\{T3, T4\}$ and $\{T1, T2\}$ is that subjects in the former treatment groups have also made their ITT forecasts before their compliance forecasts, which was not the case for the latter. However, we have no theoretically compelling reason to believe that being asked to forecast treatment effects would affect the forecast for compliance rates.

⁵Compliance forecasts were, however, inelastic to the pilot prime when we compare only T1 with T2. See Table A.1.

the likely ITT. Thus, forecasters appear to disregard a crucial piece of information, compliance with the treatment in the RCT, when making forecasts about the likely effects of the intervention. This is particularly troubling because subjects' guess about compliance is also inaccurate.

3.3 Heterogeneity by Expert Status

Not all subjects are equally likely to use pilot results in their forecasts of compliance rates. In Table 6, we reports heterogeneous effects for subjects who rated themselves on a familiarity scale ranging from 1–4, where 1 is least familiar and 4 is most familiar. Subjects were asked, “How familiar are you with research on the use of information technology to improve governance?” The measure thus captures the subject’s self-professed degree of expertise with the subject domain. We have dichotomized the familiarity variable so that subjects who responded 3 or 4 on the familiarity question (familiar or very familiar with ICT in governance) are coded 1 and 0 otherwise. We report compliance rates for answering the call and then for answering the MPA’s question conditional on having answered the call.⁶

Although the main effect of receiving information about pilot results on the compliance forecasts is statistically insignificant, the interaction effect for full compliance (answering a question conditional on having answered the call) is 16 percentage points higher for subjects who are more familiar with ICT research, as evidenced by the coefficient on the interaction term. That is, subjects who claim more expertise are more likely to forecast high compliance after seeing the null results of the pilot. (Note that we do not observe a similar conditional treatment effect for compliance rates with respect to answering the call.) This is exactly the reverse of subjects who admit unfamiliarity with ICT research. The latter forecast a similar 16 percentage point *decline* in full compliance once they see the pilot results. In other words, those familiar with the research area are not discouraged in their compliance forecasts by null results of the pilot; they remain equally optimistic about compliance

⁶We report (null) results for treatment effects interacted with respondents’ optimism about information technology to improve governance in Table A.2.

Table 6: Effect heterogeneity for compliance forecasts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Compliance rate for call	Compliance rate for question
Pilot results x Familiar	0.009 (0.048)	0.165*** (0.058)
Pilot results	-0.056 (0.034)	-0.161*** (0.040)
Familiar	0.048 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.039)
Constant	0.490*** (0.023)	0.560*** (0.026)
Num. obs.	276	276

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. OLS estimates with HC2 standard errors. *Compliance rate for call* refers to the percentage of treated RCT subjects who answer the MPA's call. *Compliance rate for question* refers to the percentage of treated RCT subjects answering the call who also answer the MPA's question. *Familiar* refers to subjects who score themselves "familiar" or "very familiar" with ICT in governance.

rates even in the face of null results in the pilot. Thus, more expert forecasters are more inaccurate in their forecasts of compliance, conditional on seeing null pilot results.

Figure 2 breaks down this interaction effect into its constituent terms. The results depicted there show that subjects who rated themselves less familiar with information technology experiments were responsive to the treatment we induced; that is, when they saw the — largely discouraging — pilot results, they lowered their forecasts of compliance. Among those unfamiliar, the difference between treatment and control group means of compliance forecasts is 16 percentage points and significant at $p < 0.001$; those in the treatment group have a 16 percentage point lower compliance forecast than those in control. By contrast, subjects who reported themselves familiar with information technology were less responsive to the information that the pilot generated null results, and in fact did not alter their forecasts of compliance at all. Among this group of subjects, the difference between treatment and control is -0.4 percentage points and not significantly different from zero, again confirming that null results from the pilot did not depress their beliefs about compliance.




Figure 2: Heterogeneous treatment effects according to familiarity. Here, we plot predicted compliance forecasts for different treatment groups according to whether they have received pilot results before making the compliance forecasts or not, and those separately for subgroups defined by familiarity with the use of technology in improving governance. To measure familiarity, we asked: ‘How familiar are you with research on the use of information technology to improve governance?’ [1 = very familiar; 4 = very unfamiliar]. We then dichotomized this variable collapsing the categories (1,2) into familiar as well as (3,4) into unfamiliar.

4 Interpretation and Discussion

We have reported three main results in the material above. First, expert forecasters expect the intervention to succeed, in the sense of generating significant treatment effects — although in fact, it did not. Second, item ordering for treatment effects and for compliance, inducing variation in the amount and nature of information available to forecasters, does not generate differences in treatment effect forecasts. Third, subjects familiar with the subject domain of the intervention are particularly unresponsive to new information and even more overly-optimistic than subjects who admit unfamiliarity with the subject domain. Subjects appear wedded to the belief that an intervention will produce significant treatment effects even in the fact of evidence that this is unlikely.

Is this apparent optimism about RCTs warranted? The data suggests not. In economics, about half of RCTs produce null results, according to multiple analyses of published results (see Snyder and Zhuo (2018), tab. 2 and Brodeur, Cook and Heyes (2020), fig. 2). In impact evaluations of development programs, most published results are likewise statistically insignificant (Vivalt, 2019). In political science, we collected data on all RCTs published in the discipline’s top three journals between 2012 and 2021 (up to the April 2021 issues). We report the data in Figure 3, which depicts bar graphs showing the proportion of articles in the *American Political Science Review*, the *American Journal of Political Science*, and the *Journal of Politics* that feature RCTs and of these, the proportion with null results on the main treatment effect. The data show that while only up to 5% of articles in the top political science journals feature RCTs in the past ten years, the proportion of published null results within those RCT studies is much higher: nearly 50% for the *APSR* and around 33% for *AJPS* and *JOP*.




Figure 3: Published RCTs in political science and those reporting null results, 2012–2021. The left-hand panel shows the proportion of articles reporting results from an RCT out of all articles published in the respective journal. Over the period, the *APSR* published 519 articles, *AJPS* 564, and *JOP* 793. The right-hand panel looks only at articles that reported results from an RCT and distinguishes between those that reported null results on the main treatment effect of the intervention and those that reported a significant treatment effect. Data collection procedures and coding principles are detailed in Appendix B.

Of course, perhaps this is what we should expect. It is difficult to p-hack results of a randomized con-

trolled trial since sampling is random; indeed, it is in part for this very reason that RCTs constitute the scientific benchmark. RCTs themselves are not drawn from a random distribution. That is, scholars do not perform field experiments randomly selecting from all the possible experiments and locations. Instead, it is a reasonable guess that scholars select experiments they *hope* will be successful. Thus, we might anticipate more than 5 percent of RCTs to produce significant results at the 5 percent level. But how much more? We have no way to know. Despite this, the average published RCT is statistically likely to generate a null result, as the data depicted in Figure 3 documents. Thus, the academics and policy practitioners who participated in our forecasting experiment are on average unrealistically optimistic about the treatment effects that an RCT is likely to generate. The “right” answer is that the average RCT will generate a treatment effect of 0. Overoptimism is unlikely to be the result of publication bias because consumers of RCTs have been exposed to many published null results.

Possibly the experts we enrolled in the forecasting experiment read the description of the RCT that was presented and thoughtfully concluded that it was specifically likely to generate significant results. But it is difficult to interpret our data that way. Respondents more familiar with the subject domain of the intervention were more resistant to using new information to recalibrate their forecasts than inexpert respondents. This suggests that expertise may bring with particular bias and that experts in information treatments to improve governance are deeply wedded to the hope that these treatments will be effective.

Our findings lend additional weight to other work, in particular, [Dunning et al. \(2019\)](#), ch. 12 that shows that policy practitioners continue to support funding research even when a meta analysis shows the research agenda is unlikely to be successful. That is, experts seem reluctant to update even in the face of strong evidence that suggests greater caution is warranted for a particular line of work. We applaud caution in interpreting single studies and agree that multiple pieces of research should underlie any conclusions. But we would like to see researchers adjust their expectations in light of cumulative findings that point one way or another.

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Appendices

A Additional Results

Table A.1: Effects of pilot prime on compliance forecasts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Compliance rate for call	Compliance rate for question
Pilot prime	0.021 (0.032)	-0.041 (0.038)
Constant	0.502*** (0.021)	0.566*** (0.028)
Num. obs.	144	144

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. OLS estimates from regressions of compliance forecasts on the pilot prime indicator with HC2 standard errors. *Compliance rate for call* refers to the percentage of treated RCT subjects who answer the MPA's call. *Compliance rate for question* refers to the percentage of treated RCT subjects answering the call who also answer the MPA's question.

Table A.2: Effect heterogeneity compliance forecasts

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Compliance rate for call	Compliance rate for question
Pilot results x Neutral	0.042 (0.064)	0.021 (0.076)
Pilot results x Optimistic	-0.037 (0.064)	-0.034 (0.077)
Optimistic	0.005 (0.044)	-0.026 (0.050)
Neutral	-0.019 (0.042)	-0.016 (0.051)
Pilot results	-0.049 (0.047)	-0.087 (0.056)
Constant	0.520*** (0.031)	0.568*** (0.037)
Num. obs.	247	247

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. OLS estimates with HC2 standard errors. *Compliance rate for call* refers to the percentage of treated RCT subjects who answer the MPA's call. *Compliance rate for question* refers to the percentage of treated RCT subjects answering the call who also answer the MPA's question. *Optimistic* refers to subjects who ranked themselves Very optimistic or Optimistic on a 1-5 scale that asked "How optimistic are you about the potential for information technology to improve governance in Pakistan?"

Table A.3: Effects on Forecasting Errors

	Phone		Question		Call MPA		
	Compl.	Compl.	Compl.	Compl.	ITT	ITT	ITT
Pilot prime	-0.003 (0.028)		-0.046 (0.034)		0.001 (0.005)		-0.006 (0.007)
Compliance prime		-0.039* (0.022)		0.052** (0.025)		0.001 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.008)
Interaction PxC							0.012 (0.010)
Constant	0.240*** (0.020)	0.277*** (0.017)	0.348*** (0.024)	0.274*** (0.018)	0.045*** (0.004)	0.044*** (0.004)	0.047*** (0.006)
Num. obs.	144	277	144	277	280	280	280

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. OLS estimates from regressions of compliance and ITT forecast errors on treatment group indicators with HC2 standard errors. Errors are defined as the absolute distance of initial forecasts vs actual compliance rates (73.1% for answering phone, 23.8% for answering question conditional on picking up the phone) or vs pilot information we told subjects about in the treatment (0.09 sd).

Table A.4: Effects on Correct Updating Direction

	MPA			Government			Accountability		
	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT
Pilot prime	-0.005 (0.006)		-0.011 (0.008)	0.006 (0.006)		0.014 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.007)		-0.001 (0.009)
Compliance prime		0.012* (0.006)	0.005 (0.008)		-0.004 (0.006)	0.003 (0.010)		-0.007 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.009)
Interaction PxC			0.013 (0.013)			-0.014 (0.013)			-0.011 (0.013)
Constant	0.033*** (0.004)	0.024*** (0.004)	0.030*** (0.006)	-0.057*** (0.005)	-0.052*** (0.004)	-0.059*** (0.007)	0.034*** (0.005)	0.034*** (0.004)	0.035*** (0.007)
Num. obs.	280	280	280	280	280	280	280	280	280

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. OLS estimates from regressions of a continuous variable measuring the extent of updating in the correct direction on treatment group indicators with HC2 standard errors. Updating in the correct direction measures the unit change in the update toward the right estimate for each outcome. Depending on where the subjects started (above or below the pilot estimate they were informed about), positive values indicate moving to the correct direction from *either* side.

Table A.5: Effects on Updating Magnitude

	MPA			Government			Accountability		
	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT
Pilot prime	-0.001 (0.007)		0.003 (0.008)	0.007 (0.007)		0.015 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.007)		0.012 (0.010)
Compliance prime		-0.004 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.009)		-0.003 (0.007)	0.005 (0.010)		-0.015** (0.007)	-0.001 (0.011)
Interaction PxC			-0.008 (0.014)			-0.016 (0.013)			-0.027* (0.015)
Constant	-0.021*** (0.005)	-0.020*** (0.004)	-0.021*** (0.006)	-0.056*** (0.005)	-0.051*** (0.005)	-0.059*** (0.007)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.024*** (0.005)	0.017** (0.008)
Num. obs.	280	280	280	280	280	280	280	280	280

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. OLS estimates from regressions of the extent of updating of ITT forecasts on treatment group indicators with HC2 standard errors. Updating is defined as the difference between revised and initial ITT estimate, respectively for all outcomes.

Table A.6: Effects on Forecasted ITT (Call only treatment)

	MPA			Government			Accountability		
	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT
Pilot prime	0.002 (0.007)		0.003 (0.011)	0.005 (0.007)		-0.002 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.008)		-0.017 (0.012)
Compliance prime		0.008 (0.007)	0.008 (0.011)		0.002 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.010)		0.017** (0.008)	0.005 (0.013)
Interaction PxC			-0.000 (0.015)			0.015 (0.014)			0.023 (0.017)
Constant	0.088*** (0.005)	0.085*** (0.005)	0.083*** (0.009)	0.057*** (0.005)	0.059*** (0.005)	0.060*** (0.007)	0.051*** (0.006)	0.039*** (0.006)	0.048*** (0.010)
Num. obs.	280	280	280	280	280	280	280	280	280

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. OLS estimates from regressions of all forecasted outcomes on treatment group indicators with HC2 standard errors. We focus here on the forecasts for the effects of the Call only (generic) treatments on the individual indices separately, i.e. forecasted ITT for MPA evaluation, Government evaluation and Prospects for accountability.

Table A.7: Effects on Forecasted ITT (Responsive treatment)

	MPA			Government			Accountability		
	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT	ITT
Pilot prime	0.001 (0.008)		0.008 (0.011)	0.010 (0.008)		0.008 (0.011)	0.001 (0.009)		-0.009 (0.012)
Compliance prime		0.010 (0.008)	0.017 (0.011)		0.012 (0.008)	0.009 (0.010)		0.009 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.012)
Interaction PxC			-0.013 (0.016)			0.006 (0.015)			0.022 (0.017)
Constant	0.099*** (0.005)	0.094*** (0.006)	0.090*** (0.009)	0.070*** (0.005)	0.069*** (0.005)	0.064*** (0.008)	0.063*** (0.006)	0.059*** (0.006)	0.064*** (0.009)
Num. obs.	280	280	280	280	280	280	280	280	280

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. OLS estimates from regressions of all forecasted outcomes on treatment group indicators with HC2 standard errors. We focus here on the forecasts for the effects of the Responsive treatment on the individual indices separately, i.e. forecasted ITT for MPA evaluation, Government evaluation and Prospects for accountability.

B Data collection procedures and coding principles for published RCTs

We collected data for Figure 3 as follows:

1. Webscrape all abstracts from the webpages of the three journals (*APSR*, *AJPS*, and *JOP* until April 2021. We exclude short articles (research notes), symposia, book reviews, and the like and include only research articles.
2. Identify articles that report results from an RCT via a text search using the following main search words: “field experiment” and “RCT.”
3. Check procedure via text search with the following search words and hand-code whether an RCT or not: “experiment,” “random,” “trial,” and “program eval.”

4. Among articles reporting RCTs, hand-code whether main treatment effect on main outcome variable as hypothesized is null, i.e. does not have a significant effect at $p < 0.05$.
5. We do not consider heterogeneous treatment effects as main effects of an intervention, so the study is coded as reporting a null result if the main effect is null even if heterogeneous treatment effects are significant.

C Additional Sample Information

Table C.1: Summary statistics on main variables

Variable	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Familiarity	2.401	0.82	1	4
Optimism	3.056	0.86	1	5
Forecast Call Avg.	0.066	0.05	-0.21	0.22
Forecast Call Accountability	0.048	0.07	-0.25	0.25
Forecast Call Government	0.06	0.059	-0.15	0.25
Forecast Call MPA	0.089	0.061	-0.25	0.25
Forecast Responsive Avg.	0.079	0.056	-0.19	0.25
Forecast Responsive Accountability	0.064	0.072	-0.15	0.25
Forecast Responsive Government	0.075	0.063	-0.25	0.25
Forecast Responsive MPA	0.099	0.064	-0.17	0.25
Compliance rate phone	0.489	0.201	0.03	0.9
Compliance rate question	0.509	0.245	0.01	0.95

Table C.2: Experimental Subjects

Experiment	Wave	N
Experimental	CERP	27
Experimental	CPList	203
Experimental	Grad Students	35
Experimental	UCSD	15
Experimental	total	280
Non-experimental	IMS	90
Non-experimental	NYU	30
Non-experimental	total	120

D Balance Tests

Table D.1: Balance tests

	Familiarity			Optimism		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Mean T1	2.309*** (0.105)	2.426*** (0.069)	2.468*** (0.063)	3.066*** (0.130)	3.050*** (0.076)	3.130*** (0.071)
T2	0.131 (0.141)			-0.006 (0.159)		
T3	0.052 (0.150)			-0.158 (0.165)		
T4	0.191 (0.134)			0.149 (0.170)		
Compliance prime		-0.049 (0.098)			0.013 (0.109)	
Pilot prime			-0.132 (0.098)			-0.146 (0.109)
Num. obs.	279	279	279	249	249	249
F statistic	0.793	0.247	1.811	1.392	0.014	1.807

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. OLS estimates from regressions of familiarity [1, 4] and optimism [1, 5] variables on treatment group indicators with HC2 standard errors. For Compliance first (T1, T2), the reference group is (T3, T4) and for Pilot prime (T1, T3), the reference group is (T2, T4).

Table D.2: Balance Test I For Forecaster Position

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Faculty	Other research staff	Postdoc
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Compliance prime (T1+T2)	0.030 (0.281)	-0.027 (0.393)	-0.589 (0.565)
Mean T3+T4	0.638*** (0.203)	-0.666** (0.282)	-1.308*** (0.356)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	643.523	643.523	643.523

Note:

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$
 Multinomial logit coefficients from regressions of forecaster position with omitted baseline category Graduate students.

Table D.3: Balance Test II For Forecaster Position

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Faculty	Other research staff	Postdoc
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Pilot prime (T1+T3)	0.055 (0.281)	-0.496 (0.400)	0.225 (0.553)
Mean T2+T4	0.625*** (0.201)	-0.460* (0.261)	-1.692*** (0.411)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	642.278	642.278	642.278

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Multinomial logit coefficients from regressions of forecaster position with omitted baseline category Graduate students.

Table D.4: Balance Test III For Forecaster Position

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Faculty	Other research staff	Postdoc
	(1)	(2)	(3)
T1	0.407 (0.391)	0.606 (0.556)	0.200 (0.876)
T2	0.440 (0.396)	0.124 (0.610)	0.951 (0.777)
T3	-0.128 (0.400)	0.501 (0.551)	0.383 (0.824)
Mean T1	0.464* (0.272)	-1.012** (0.413)	-1.992*** (0.615)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	649.614	649.614	649.614

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Multinomial logit coefficients from regressions of forecaster position with omitted baseline category Graduate students.