Updated: Aug 6, 2022
This paper studies election fraud in the competitive but not fully consolidated multiparty democracy of Ghana. Results from a randomized field experiment are used to investigate the effectiveness of newly-introduced biometric identification machines in reducing election fraud in Ghana's December 2012 national elections. We uncover a non-random pattern to the frequent breakdowns of the equipment. In polling stations with a randomly assigned domestic election observer, machines were about 50 percent less likely to experience breakdown as they were in polling stations without observers. We also find that electoral competition in the parliamentary race is strongly associated with greater machine breakdown.
Machine malfunction in turn facilitated election fraud, including overvoting, registry discrepancies, and ballot stuffing, especially where election observers were not present. Our results substantiate that partisan competition may promote election fraud in a newly-established competitive democracy. They also show that domestic election observers improve election integrity through direct observation and also thanks to their second-order effects on election administration.
Recently discussed in The Monkey Cage.
Utilizing data on self-reported criminal charges lodged against candidates to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Lok Sabha, India's lower house of representatives, in this paper we study the patterns of criminal candidate selection in 2004 and 2009 by India's political parties. Indian political parties are more likely to select candidates charged with criminal wrongdoing when confronting greater electoral uncertainty and in parliamentary constituencies whose populations exhibit lower levels of literacy. We model these findings formally to interpret them and we discuss the mechanisms that might underlie the patterns we uncover.