Co-authored with Matteo F. Ferroni
We analyze original survey data of legislators in Colombia, Italy, and two Pakistani
provinces to study determinants of preferences for redistribution. We examine the
relationship between preferences for redistribution and individual-level variables that
include legislator demographic characteristics, reasons for entering politics, and partisanship. We find that large majorities of legislators in all three countries have pro-redistributive preferences, as do ordinary citizens. Generally, legislators with more pro-social motivations for entering politics are also more favorably inclined towards
redistribution. Partisan affiliations are also strongly and significantly correlated with preferences for redistribution in most places. We interpret these results to suggest that the views of elected representatives about redistribution tend to align with their values and partisanship, and that for these elites, redistributive preferences may be
independent of their social positions.
- golden247
- Dec 24, 2024
Updated: Aug 27
Co-authored with Eugenia Nazrullaeva and Dylan Potts
Prior scholarship contends that control over patronage appointments confers the incumbent an electoral advantage. We study the introduction of state-level legislation that abolished patronage appointments to the civil services of the 50 US states between 1900 and 2016. Using recently-developed statistical methods appropriate to reform's staggered introduction, we show that legislators were much less likely to be reelected during the patronage era than after the introduction of civil service reform. Reelection rates for legislators significantly and substantially increase following reform, when political careers also lengthen. We explore both selection and performance explanations for this surprising result.
- golden247
- Aug 13, 2024
Updated: Oct 15
To understand the paucity of forceful anti-corruption policies, we study legislator and citizen beliefs and preferences about corruption in three countries. Deploying parallel surveys in Colombia, Italy, and Pakistan, we investigate support for a political agency theory that sees politicians as rent-seekers and for an information theory under which politicians misperceive voter preferences. We find limited support for either. Using vignettes that invoke tradeoffs that could result in corruption, we find that citizens and politicians in all three countries perceive corruption as common and are equally likely to condemn it. Politicians' understanding of citizens' concerns are largely accurate, and an information treatment informing legislators of citizens' preferences leads legislators to believe citizens are less concerned about corruption, since the treatment primarily impacts those who initially overestimated citizen concerns. Our evidence suggests that feeble anti-corruption policy agendas may persist because established political parties lack electoral incentives to prioritize fighting corruption.